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Abstract
Given a finite set X and an ordering  over its subsets, the l-out-of-
d maximin-share of X is the maximal (by ) subset of X that can be
constructed by partitioning X into d parts and picking the worst union
of l parts. A pair of integers (l, d) dominates a pair (l′, d′) if, for any
set X and ordering , the l-out-of-d maximin-share of X is at least as
good (by ) as the l′-out-of-d′ maximin-share of X. This note presents
a necessary and sufficient condition for deciding whether a given pair of
integers dominates another pair, and an algorithm for finding all non-
dominated pairs. It compares the l-out-of-d maximin-share to some other
criteria for fair allocation of indivisible objects among people with different
entitlements.
1 Introduction
The concept of maximin share was invented by Budish (2011) in his study of
fair allocation of indivisible items.
Suppose first thatm identical items have to be allocated fairly among n peo-
ple. Ideally, each person should receive m/n items, but this may be impossible
ifm is not a multiple by n, since the items are indivisible. A natural second-best
fairness criterion is to round m/n down to the nearest integer, and give each
person at least ⌊m/n⌋ items. Receiving less than ⌊m/n⌋ items is “too unfair”
— it is an unfairness that is not justified by the indivisibility of the items.
Suppose now that the items are different, and each item has a different value.
Now, rounding down to the nearest integer may not be the right solution. For
example, suppose n = 3 and m = 5 and the items’ values are 1, 3, 5, 6, 9. The
sum of values is 24, and it is divisible by 3, so ideally we would like to give each
person a value of at least 8, but this is not possible. The largest value that can
be guaranteed to all three agents is 7, by the partition {1, 6}, {3, 5}, {9}. So
here, 7 is the total value divided by 3 “rounded down to the nearest item”. The
set {1, 6} attaining this maximin value is called the “1-out-of-3 maximin-share
(MMS)” — it is the best subset of items that can be constructed by partitioning
the original set into 3 parts and taking the least valuable part (see Section 2 for
formal definitions).
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By definition, when all agents agree on the values of the different items, it is
always possible to give each agent at least his/her 1-out-of-n MMS (this is not
necessarily true when agents disagree; see Section 6 for details).
However, the 1-out-of-n maximin-share makes sense only when all agents
have the same rights. In many cases, different agents may have different rights.
For example, suppose Alice and Bob have a partnership where Alice has 40%
and Bob has 60% of the shares. If the partnership is dissolved and they want
to divide the property among them, Alice would naturally like to get at least
her 2-out-of-5 MMS — the best subset that can be constructed by partitioning
the original set into 5 parts and taking the 2 least valuable ones. In the above
example, it is easy to see that the 2-out-of-5 MMS is {1, 3}.
But Alice can rightfully complain that giving her {1, 3} is not fair: her enti-
tlement is 40%, which is larger than 1/3. Therefore she should get at least the
1-out-of-3 MMS, which — as shown above — is {1, 6}. This example illustrates
an interesting property of the MMS: it is possible that l/d < l′/d′, but still the
l-out-of-d MMS is better than the l′-out-of-d′ MMS! Similarly, Bob should get
at least his 3-out-of-5 MMS, which is {1, 3, 5}, but also at least his 1-out-of-2
MMS, which is {9, 3}. Again, {9, 3} is better although 1/2 < 3/5.
In the above example, it is possible to satisfy both fairness requirements of
both agents, for example by giving {1, 6} to Alice and {3, 5, 9} to Bob. But are
these really the only “relevant” fairness conditions? There are infinitely many
fractions that are smaller than 2/5; how many of them should we verify, in
order to ensure that the allocation is fair for Alice? There are infinitely many
fractions that are smaller than 3/5; how many of them should we verify in order
to ensure that the allocation is fair for Bob?
To answer this question, we define a dominance relation, which is a partial
order on the pairs of positive integers. We say that a pair (l, d) dominates a
pair (l′, d′), if the l-out-of-d MMS is better than the l′-out-of-d′ MMS for any
set of items with any values. If (l, d) dominates (l′, d′), and both l/d and l′/d′
are smaller than 0.4, then Alice does not need to check the l′-out-of-d′ MMS
in order to verify that her allocation is fair; it is sufficient that she checks the
l-out-of-d MMS.
The dominance relation is only a partial order. The above example shows
that (2, 5) does not dominate (1, 3); it is easy to construct an example show-
ing that (1, 3) does not dominate (2, 5) either (for example, with 5 identical
items, the 2-out-of-5 MMS is better than the 1-out-of-3 MMS). The present
note shows a necessary and sufficient condition for deciding whether a given
pair dominates another given pair. The condition is constructive and implies
an efficient algorithm for enumerating all MMS fairness conditions that are not
dominated.
2 Notation
Let X be a finite set. Let  be a weak ordering on the subsets of X . We assume
that  is (weakly) monotonically increasing, i.e.: X1 ⊇ X2 implies X1  X2.
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As a special case, X may be a set of non-negative numbers, and  may
order the subsets of X according to their sum, so for example {9} ≻ {1, 5} 
{6} ≻ {1, 3} etc. We call such an ordering additive. In general, we allow X to
be any set and  to be any monotonically-increasing ordering on its subsets —
not necessarily additive.
For every integer d ≥ 1, Partition(X, d) denotes the set of all partitions of
X into d subsets (some possibly empty).
For every vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) of sets, and every integer l ∈ {1, . . . , d},
Union(Y, l) denotes the set of all unions of exactly l different sets from Y,
Yj1 ∪ Yj2 ∪ · · · ∪ Yjl.
For every setX and integers l, d with 1 ≤ l ≤ d, the l-out-of-d maximin-share
of X is denoted
[
l
d
]
X and defined as:
[
l
d
]
X := max
Y∈Partition(X,d)
min
Z∈Union(Y,l)
Z
where max,min are based on the ordering .
If  is not a strict order, then the minimum and maximum may be multi-
valued, in which case there may be several different sets that qualify as
[
l
d
]
X .
These sets are all equivalent by, so there should be no ambiguity in expressions
such as
[
l
d
]
X  Z or Z 
[
l
d
]
X .
Let (l, d) and (l′, d′) be two pairs of integers with 1 ≤ l ≤ d and 1 ≤ l′ ≤ d′.
We say that (l, d) dominates (l′, d′) if, for any finite set X with a subset-ordering
:
[
l
d
]
X 
[
l′
d′
]
X.
It is easy to see that, whenever l ≥ l′ and d ≤ d′, the pair (l, d) dominates
(l′, d′). So for example, (5, 6) dominates (5, 7) which dominates (4, 7). Deciding
whether a domination holds becomes more challenging when l and d change in
the same direction.
3 Characterization of dominance
Recall that, by the integer division theorem, for every two positive integers d′, d,
there exists a unique pair of integers, q ≥ 1 and r ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, such that
d′ = qd− r.
Lemma 3.1. Let l, d, l′, d′ be integers such that 1 ≤ l ≤ d and 1 ≤ l′ ≤ d′.
Let q ≥ 1 and r ∈ {0, . . . , d−1} be the unique integers for which d′ = qd− r.
Then (l, d) dominates (l′, d′) if and only if ql −min(l, r) ≥ l′.
The following running example is used to illustrate the proof. Let l = 2, d =
3, d′ = 7, so d′ = 3 · d− 2 and q = 3, r = 2.
Taking l′ = 3 · l − 2 = 4 yields that (2, 3) dominates (4, 7).
In contrast, taking l′ = 5, yields that (2, 3) does not dominate (5, 7).
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Proof of Lemma 3.1.
If part.
We assume that ql − min(l, r) ≥ l′. We should prove that, for every finite
set X with a subset-ordering,
[
l
d
]
X 
[
l′
d′
]
X .
Let W ′ :=
[
l′
d′
]
X . By definition of the maximin share, there exists a par-
tition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d′), such that W ′ = min≻Union(Y′, l′). W.l.o.g.
denote the bundles in that union by Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
l′ (in the running example, W
′ is
a union of 4 bundles from a partition of X into 7 bundles).
We now construct a new partition Y ∈ Partition(X, d), in which each part
is a union of zero or more bundles from Y′. In the new partition there will
be l “small parts” and d − l “large parts”: the small parts will be unions of
a small number of bundles from Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
l′ , and the large parts will be unions
of a larger number of bundles from Y ′l′+1, . . . , Y
′
d′ . The construction is slightly
different depending on whether or not l ≥ r.
If l ≥ r, then Y is constructed as follows.
• Each of the l small parts is union of at most q bundles from Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
l′
(in the running example, the small parts may be Y1 := Y
′
1 ∪ Y
′
2 and Y2 :=
Y ′3 ∪ Y
′
4). This is possible since by assumption ql ≥ l
′ + min(l, r) ≥ l′.
Note that some of these l parts may be empty.
• Each of the d−l large parts is a union of at least q bundles from Y ′l′+1, . . . , Y
′
d′
(in the running example, the large part may be Y3 := Y
′
5 ∪ Y
′
6 ∪ Y
′
7). This
is possible since by assumption q(d − l) = qd − ql = d′ + r − (ql) ≤
d′ + r − (l′ +min(r, l)) = d′ + r − (l′ + r) = d′ − l′.
If l < r, then Y is constructed as follows.
• Each of the l small parts is union of at most q−1 bundles from Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
l′ .
This is possible since by assumption (q− 1)l = ql− l = ql−min(l, r) ≥ l′.
• Each of the d − l large parts is a union of at least q − 1 bundles from
Y ′l′+1, . . . , Y
′
d′ . This is possible since by assumption (q − 1)(d− l) = (qd−
d)− (ql − l) = (d′ + r − d)− (ql −min(r, l)) < (d′)− (l′).
The important property of this construction, in both cases, is that each small
part contains at most as many bundles from Y′ as any large part.
Let W be any bundle in Union(Y, l). Then W is a union of at least l′
bundles from Y′. Indeed, if W is a union of the l small parts, then by definition
it is the union of the l′ bundles Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
l′ from Y
′. Otherwise, W is a union
that contains some large parts. Since each large part contains at least as many
bundles from Y′ as each small part, W is a union of at least l′ bundles from
Y′ (in the running example, any union of 2 parts from Y, is a union of 4 or 5
bundles from Y′).
In any case, W contains a union of l′ bundles from Y′; denote this union
by W ′′. Note that W ⊇ W ′′, so by the monotonicity of the subset ordering,
W  W ′′. By definition of the maximin share, W ′ is the minimum element
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in Union(Y′, l′). But W ′′ ∈ Union(Y′, l′), so W ′′  W ′. By transitivity,
W W ′.
This is true for any bundle W ∈ Union(Y, l). Hence it is also true for the
minimum bundle in Union(Y, l), which is by definition
[
l
d
]
X .
Only-if part.
We assume that ql − min(l, r) < l′. We should show a finite set X and a
subset-ordering for which
[
l
d
]
X ≺
[
l′
d′
]
X .
Let X be a set with d′ elements. Let  be an ordering that considers only
the cardinality (larger sets are better).1 Obviously,
[
l′
d′
]
X contains l′ items and
its value is l′.
The most balanced partition of X into d parts contains r parts with q − 1
items and d− r parts with q items.
If l ≥ r, then the l low-value parts contain the r parts with q − 1 items and
l− r additional parts with q items, so their total value is: (q − 1)r + q(l− r) =
qr − r + ql − qr = ql − r = ql −min(l, r) < l′.
If l < r, the l low-value parts have q − 1 items each, so their total value is:
(q − 1)l = ql − l = ql −min(l, r) < l′.[
l
d
]
X is this union of l parts. In both cases it is strictly worse than
[
l′
d′
]
X .
Some special cases of Lemma 3.1 are presented below.
Corollary 3.1. Let l, d, l′, d′ be integers such that 1 ≤ l ≤ d and 1 ≤ l′ ≤ d′.
Then in each of the following cases, (l, d) dominates (l′, d′):
(a) When l > l′ and d = d′ (here q = 1, r = 0).
(b) When l = l′ and d < d′ (here q > 1 so ql − r = ql′ − r > l′).
(c) When l′ = l − r and d′ = d− r (here q = 1).
(d) When l′/d′ is a non-reduced fraction and l/d is its reduced fraction (here
q is the common factor of d′ and l′, so that d′ = qd and l′ = ql, and r = 0).
4 Finding all non-dominated pairs
Suppose Alice is involved in a partnership, where her entitlement is some fraction
a ∈ (0, 1). The partnership is dissolved and Alice receives some subset of the
previously shared items. She would like to decide whether she received a fair
share according to her entitlement. At first glance, to verify this she should
check the l-out-of-d MMS for all pairs (l, d) such that l/d ≤ a. However, there
are infinitely many such pairs. In fact, Alice should check only finitely many
such pairs. This is proved by the following lemma.
1 If a strict ordering is wanted, then one can let  be an additive ordering, determined by
sum of values, and assign to each element of X a distinct random value that is very close to
1.
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Lemma 4.1. For every integers h ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ l ≤ d, If |X | ≤ d then
[
l
d
]
X [
l+h
d+h
]
X.
Proof. Let W ′ :=
[
l+h
d+h
]
X . By definition of the maximin share, there exists a
partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d+ h), such that W ′ = min≻Union(Y′, l + h).
Since |X | ≤ d, at most d parts inY′ are non-empty. Consider a new partition
Y ∈ Partition(X, d), which contains all non-empty parts in Y′. Then, each
bundle W ∈ Union(Y, l) is also contained in Union(Y′, l + h), so W  W ′.
This is true, in particular, when W is the minimum bundle in Union(Y, l),
which is by definition
[
l
d
]
X .
Lemma 4.1 implies that, if the total number of allocated items is m, then
Alice should only check pairs (l, d) such that d ≤ m (in addition to l/d ≤ a).
This is already a finite number of conditions to check. Adding Lemma 3.1 allows
to reduce the number of conditions even further, using the following algorithm:
1. Let D := {1, . . . , |X |}.
2. For each d ∈ D:
• Let ld := the largest integer for which ld/d ≤ a.
3. For each pair d, d′ ∈ D with d 6= d′:
• Using integer division, find q ≥ 1, r ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} such that d′ =
qd− r.
• If qld −min(ld, r) ≥ ld′ , then remove d′ from D.
4. For each remaining d ∈ D, check the subset
[
ld
d
]
X .
The filtering in step 2 is justified by Corollary 3.1(a). The filtering in step 3
is justified by the if part of Lemma 3.1. If the condition is satisfied, (ld, d)
dominates (ld′ , d
′), so there is no need to check the subset
[
l
d′
d′
]
X .
By the only-if part of Lemma 3.1, all remaining conditions are independent
(not implied by others).
Example 4.1. Let a = 0.74 and suppose X contains 7 items. In step 2 of the
above algorithm, the following seven pairs are generated: 0/1, 1/2, 2/3, 2/4,
3/5, 4/6, 5/7. In step 3, the following pairs are filtered out:
• 0/1 is filtered out by 2/3 (with q = 1, r = 2).
• 1/2 is filtered out by 2/3 (with q = 1, r = 1).
• 2/4 is filtered out by 2/3 (with q = 2, r = 2).
• 3/5 is filtered out by 5/7 (with q = 1, r = 2).
• 4/6 is filtered out by 2/3 (with q = 2, r = 0).
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In step 4, the following MMS bundles remain:[
2
3
]
X
[
5
7
]
X
So, to verify that she got a fair share (by the MMS criterion), Alice should
compare her bundle to these two subsets only.
As implied by Lemma 3.1, with l = 2, l′ = 5, d = 3, d′ = 7, these two
comparisons are independent. For example, suppose Alice’s preferences are
additive. Then, if she values the items in X at {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0} then
[
2
3
]
X is
worth 2 and
[
5
7
]
B is worth 1 so the comparison to
[
2
3
]
X is stronger, while if
she values the items in X at {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} then
[
2
3
]
X is worth 4 and
[
5
7
]
X
is worth 5 so the comparison to
[
5
7
]
X is stronger.
5 Ordinal vs. Cardinal MMS
Suppose we are given a set M of items, an order relation  on 2M, and a
vector of n entitlements t = (t1, . . . , tn), with
∑n
i=1 ti = 1. Our goal is to find
a partition X1 ⊔ · · · ⊔Xn =M that is “fair” with respect to the vector t.
Define a partitionX as Ordinal-MMS (OMMS) fair for i if, for every positive
integers l, d with l/d ≤ ti, Xi 
[
l
d
]
M. In the previous section we saw that,
despite the infinite number of pairs l, d satisfying with l/d ≤ ti, it is still possible
to check in finite time whether a given allocation is OMMS-fair. Note that
OMMS-fairness is based only on the order relation  on subsets of M (hence
the name ordinal).
In this section we consider a special case in which M is a multi-set of num-
bers. For any subset Z ⊆ M, denote by V (Z) the sum of elements of Z. The
relation  orders subsets by their sum, so that Z1  Z2 ⇐⇒ V (Z1) ≥ V (Z2).
Arguably, an ideal partition is a partition X into n bundles in which, for each
bundle i, V (Xi) = ti · V (M). In case such a partition does not exist, we would
like a partition that is “as close as possible” to that ideal partition . This is
formalized by the following definition (it is based on the weighted-MMS notion
of Farhadi et al. (2019)):
WMMS(M, t, i) := ti ·
(
max
Y∈Partition(M,n)
min
j∈N
V (Yj)
tj
)
A partitionX is calledWMMS-fair for i if V (Xi) ≥WMMS(M, t, i). Note that
the WMMS crucially depends on the choice of the function V : different functions
V lead to different WMMS values, even if they induce the same ordering on the
subsets of Z.
If all entitlements are equal (ti = 1/n for all i), then WMMS(M, t, i) is
exactly the value of
[
1
n
]
M, so WMMS-fairness and OMMS-fairness coincide.
However, when the entitlements are different, these two notions are different —
none of them dominates the other one.
The following proposition shows thatWMMS-fairness may be strictly stronger
than OMMS-fairness.
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Proposition 5.1. There are sets M and vectors t of size n = 2, for which, for
all i ∈ [n] and all positive integers l, d with l/d ≤ ti:
WMMS(M, t, i) > V
([
l
d
]
M
)
.
Proof. Let n = 2 and t = (0.4, 0.6) andM = {40, 60}. Then, WMMS(M, t, 1) =
40 and WMMS(M, t, 2) = 60 by the partition Y = ({40}, {60}), and this is the
unique WMMS-fair partition.
Since M contains two items, Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1 imply that only bundles
with d ∈ {1, 2} should be checked for the right-hand side. Since t1 < 1/2, the
most valuable MMS bundle for l/d ≤ t1 is ∅. Since t2 < 1, the most valuable
MMS bundle for l/d ≤ t2 is
[
1
2
]
M = {40}. So:
WMMS(M, t, 1) = 40 > 0 = V (∅)
WMMS(M, t, 2)− 60 > 40 = V (
[
1
2
]
M)
Indeed, every partition in which |X2| ≥ 1 is OMMS-fair.
The following proposition shows that WMMS-fairness may be strictly weaker
than OMMS-fairness.
Proposition 5.2. There are sets M and vectors t of size n = 3, for which, for
some i ∈ [n] and positive integers l, d with l/d ≤ ti:
V
([
l
d
]
M
)
> WMMS(M, t, i).
Proof. Let n = 3 and t = (0.6, 0.2, 0.2) and M = {40, 60}. Then, in any
partition ofM into three parts, at least one part is empty, so WMMS(M, t, i) =
0 for all i ∈ [3], and thus every allocation is WMMS-fair.
However, with i = 1, l = 1, d = 2, we have
[
1
2
]
M = {40}, so:
V
([
1
2
]
M
)
= 40 > 0 = WMMS(M, t, 1)
Indeed, not every partition is OMMS-fair — OMMS-fairness requires that X1
contains at least one item.
The problem with WMMS-fairness, as illustrated in the previous proposition,
is that the WMMS of i depends on the entire vector t, rather than just on ti.
To fix this, I suggest the bipartite weighted maximin-share (BMMS), defined as:
BMMS(M, ti) := ti ·
(
max
(X,Y )∈Partition(M,2)
min
(
V (X)
ti
,
V (Y )
1− ti
) )
In BMMS, in contrast to WMMS, M is always partitioned into two parts: a
part for i and a part for “all the others”. The ratio between the values of these
parts should be as near as possible to ti/(1− ti).
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When n = 2, BMMS-fairness is equivalent to WMMS-fairness. However,
they differ when n ≥ 3.
I believe that BMMS-fairness implies both WMMS-fairness and OMMS-
fairness, but have not yet had time to verify this.
Note that a WMMS-allocation, by definition, always exists. However, it
is open whether an OMMS-allocation always exists, and whether a BMMS-
allocation always exists. It is apparently open even for n = 2.
6 Related Work
This note focused on a set with a single subset-ordering . It corresponds to
a fair allocation problem in which all participants have equal preferences, but
may have different entitlements.
The maximin share was introduced in the context of fair allocation among
agents with equal entitlements but different preferences. In this problem, there
are n participants with n different subset-orderings, 1, . . . ,n, and each par-
ticipant should receive a subset of M that satisfies the fairness condition with
respect to i. In this context, Moulin (1990) introduced the fairness criterion
called positive preference externalities, which means that an agent should weakly
prefer his share to the share he would get if all agents had the same preferences.
This naturally lead to the definition of the 1-out-of-nMMS (Budish, 2011). The
generalization to l-out-of-d MMS was done by Babaioff et al. (2019a,b).
With equal entitlements and equal preferences, WMMS-fairness and OMMS-
fairness and BMMS-fairness are all equivalent, and they are all satisfied by the
allocation defining the 1-out-of-n maximin share.
With equal entitlements but different preferences, a 1-out-of-n MMS alloca-
tion always exists when n = 2 but may not exist when n ≥ 3 (Procaccia and Wang,
2014). This discovery has lead to the definition of r-fraction MMS allocation.
Suppose each preference-ordering i is represented by a cardinal value-function
Vi; then, in an r-fraction MMS allocation, for all i, Vi(Xi) ≥ r·Vi(
[
1
n
]
X). There
are algorithms for finding an r-fraction MMS allocation for various fractions r ∈
(0, 1) and various assumptions on the preference orderings (Amanatidis et al.,
2016, 2017; Barman and Krishnamurthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; Kurokawa et al.,
2018; Barman et al., 2018; Garg et al., 2018; Huang and Lu, 2019).
The case of different preferences and different entitlements was studied by
Farhadi et al. (2019); Aziz et al. (2019)
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